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Victory for Clergy Sexual Abuse Victims: The Ninth 
Circuit Strips the Holy See of Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity in Doe v. Holy See 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Doe v. Holy See,1 the Ninth Circuit narrowly upheld the 
district court’s refusal to grant a motion to dismiss by the Holy See, 
which claimed sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (“FSIA”).2 At issue was whether an exception to 
sovereign immunity permitted an alleged victim of sexual abuse by a 
Roman Catholic priest to bring suit against the Holy See, otherwise 
known as the Vatican.3 As part of its inquiry, the Ninth Circuit 
examined the pleadings to determine whether the alleged activities of 
the Holy See fit one of the statutory exceptions to sovereign 
immunity––in this case, either the commercial activity exception or 
the tortious exception.4 Additionally, the court examined the basis 
for holding the Holy See vicariously liable for the actions of its 
affiliated U.S. corporations. The court ultimately refused to address 
the commercial activity exception on jurisdictional grounds,5 but it 
addressed the remaining issues of the tortious exception and 
vicarious liability.6 The court held that the tortious exception 
applied, but only for a single respondeat superior claim against the 
Holy See.7 The court also held that the Holy See could not be held 
 
 
 1. 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 (2006). 
 3. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1069. Although in common parlance the “Holy See” and the 
“Vatican” are synonymous, they are, in fact, “separate entities . . . . The Holy See itself is not a 
state, but it is the entity that is recognized as a sovereign.” Lucian C. Martinez, Jr., Sovereign 
Impunity: Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Bar Lawsuits Against the Holy See in 
Clerical Sexual Abuse Cases?, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 123, 139 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
 4. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1074, 1081–85. For an explanation of these statutory exceptions, 
see infra Part III. 
 5. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1074. 
 6. Id. at 1077–85. 
 7. Id. at 1069. 
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vicariously liable for the behavior of its affiliated U.S. corporations 
because the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged “day-to-day control” 
over these corporations or an abuse of the corporate form.8 
This Note argues that, although the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Doe v. Holy See was correct, the court’s rationale for denying a review 
of the commercial activity exception is suspect because the majority 
demonstrated an apparently willful misunderstanding of the 
applicable legal standards. Additionally, this Note argues that the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision will have a lasting impact on future clergy 
sexual abuse litigation because (1) plaintiffs throughout the country 
will have a drafting guide to more carefully plead their claims; and 
(2) many more states may consider adopting Oregon’s expansive 
view of respondeat superior liability as a civil means of vindicating 
victims of clergy sexual abuse. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
John V. Doe alleged that in approximately 1965, when he was 
fifteen or sixteen years old, he was sexually abused multiple times by 
Father Andrew Ronan, a parish priest at St. Albert’s Church in 
Portland, Oregon.9 For these injuries, Doe not only brought claims 
against the Archdiocese of Portland and other affiliated 
organizations10 in the United States, but also against the Holy See,11 
which is the head of the worldwide Roman Catholic Church.12 The 
claims against the Holy See included (1) vicarious liability for the 
acts of its instrumentalities and domestic corporations, (2) 
respondeat superior for the actions of Ronan as an alleged employee 
of the Holy See, and (3) direct liability based on the Holy See’s own 
negligence in retention and supervision of Ronan, and its failure to 
warn of his harmful propensities.13 In response, the Holy See claimed 
sovereign immunity from suit under the FSIA and moved the court 
to dismiss the case.14  
 
 8. Id. at 1079–80. 
 9. Id. at 1070. 
 10. Doe also named the Chicago Bishop and the Order of the Friar Servants, of which 
Ronan was a member, as defendants. Id. at 1070. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1091 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (noting the “Holy See’s dual role as not only a 
sovereign government but also the head of a worldwide church”). 
 13. Id. at 1069 (per curiam). 
 14. Id. at 1071. 
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The district court denied the motion to dismiss in part, and held 
that nearly all of Doe’s tort claims (even the vicarious liability claims) 
could proceed against the Holy See by way of the tortious exception 
in the FSIA.15 The court determined that the Holy See could not 
take advantage of an exception to the tortious exception (the 
discretionary function exclusion) because the Holy See’s behavior 
was not a “policy-based” decision susceptible to the “balancing of 
competing interests.”16 The court also found that even though the 
acts of the Holy See could be otherwise considered “commercial 
activity,”17 the commercial activity exception could not apply because 
Doe’s claims “sound[ed] in tort.”18 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To better understand why the district court and the Ninth 
Circuit struggled with the application of the FSIA in this case, it is 
helpful to trace the relevant legal history. For a period of over 140 
years, the United States has granted immunity to foreign sovereigns 
from being subject to lawsuits in the United States as a “matter of 
grace and comity[,] . . . not a restriction imposed by the 
Constitution.”19 However, starting in 1952, the State Department 
announced a new approach, called the “restrictive” theory of foreign 
sovereign immunity, where immunity would only extend to the 
“public acts” of a foreign sovereign.20 Nevertheless, this new 
approach proved to be too burdensome to implement and too 
susceptible to “diplomatic pressures.”21 Thus, in 1976, Congress 
passed the FSIA, which largely codified the “restrictive” theory of 
sovereign immunity,22 and states as its purpose to “serve the interests 
of justice and . . . protect the rights of both foreign states and 
litigants in the United States courts.”23 
 
 15. Id. (noting that the district court did grant the Holy See’s motion as to Doe’s fraud 
claim). 
 16. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 956 (D. Or. 2006). 
 17. See id. at 940–41. 
 18. Id. at 942. 
 19. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). 
 20. Id. at 486–87. 
 21. Id. at 488. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006). 
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The FSIA is now the only means of obtaining jurisdiction over a 
foreign state,24 and foreign sovereigns have immunity as a general 
rule, unless one of the exceptions in the statute applies, such as the 
commercial activity exception25 or the tortious exception.26  
A. Commercial Activity Exception 
As an exception to the general rule, the FSIA states that foreign 
sovereign immunity does not apply to an action “based upon a 
commercial activity . . . by the foreign state.”27 Even though the 
FSIA defines “commercial activity,” the definition is somewhat 
circular: “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a 
particular commercial transaction or act.”28 The FSIA never directly 
defines “commercial,”29 leaving its interpretation to the courts.30 In 
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., the Supreme Court 
unanimously determined that “[a] foreign state engaging in 
‘commercial’ activities ‘do[es] not exercise powers peculiar to 
sovereigns’; rather, it ‘exercise[s] only those powers that can also be 
exercised by private citizens.’”31  
Even if a foreign sovereign has engaged in “commercial activity,” 
this activity or the act connected to the commercial activity must also 
form the basis of the plaintiff’s action.32 In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, a  
 
 
 24. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989). 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006). 
 26. Id. § 1605(a)(5). 
 27. Id. § 1605(a)(2). 
 28. Id. § 1603(d). 
 29. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992). 
 30. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359 (1993) (“[C]ongressional diffidence 
necessarily results in judicial responsibility to determine what a ‘commercial activity’ is for 
purposes of the Act.”).  
 31. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (quoting Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976)) (alternations in original). Profit motivation is largely 
immaterial to the analysis. Id.; Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018, 
1024 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[T]here is no indication that Congress intended the presence of a 
profit motive . . . to be a threshold requirement for applying the commercial activity 
exception.”); cf. H.R. REP No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 
6615 (“[I]f an activity is customarily carried on for profit, its commercial nature could readily 
be assumed.”). 
 32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006). 
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divided33 Supreme Court held that the act of arresting and torturing 
an American by the Saudi government did not meet the 
requirements of the commercial exception.34 Specifically, although 
the plaintiff alleged that his recruitment in the United States and his 
employment in Saudi Arabia (arguably commercial activities) were 
the bases of his injuries, the Court determined that his complaint was 
actually “based upon” personal injuries committed in Saudi Arabia.35 
B. Tortious Exception 
In addition to the commercial exception, the FSIA also declares 
that foreign sovereign immunity does not apply to non-commercial 
torts 
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for 
personal injury . . . caused by the tortious act or omission of that 
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state 
while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except 
this paragraph shall not apply to . . . any claim based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be 
abused.36 
Although the exact relationship between the commercial exception 
and the tortious exception is unclear,37 the latter clearly authorizes 
suits based not only on the foreign state’s own torts, but also the 
torts of its employees.38 In order to apply the tortious exception to 
the acts of the foreign state’s employees, the plaintiff must allege an 
employment relationship and that the tortious act fell within the  
 
 
 33. Although almost all the members of the Court agreed as to the judgment, there 
were four different opinions disagreeing with the majority opinion’s analysis.  
 34. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 361–62. 
 35. Id. at 358. 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006). 
 37. Judge Berzon argued that “[n]othing in the FSIA suggests that the commercial 
activity exception and the tortious act exception are mutually exclusive and cannot possibly 
apply to the same conduct. Nor does Nelson, or any other controlling case, authorize reading 
such a requirement into the statute.” Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
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scope of that employment.39 Since the FSIA doesn’t define 
“employment” or “scope of employment,” state law governs their 
meaning.40 
Although a foreign state may be liable for certain torts, it will 
preserve its sovereign immunity if it can invoke the two-part 
“discretionary function” exclusion.41 First, the challenged action or 
omission must “involve an element of judgment or choice.”42 An 
action is not discretionary if law or policy “specifically prescribes a 
course of action.”43 Second, even if the action involves discretion, it 
must be determined “whether that judgment is of the kind that the 
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”44 This 
exclusion is designed to protect decisions “grounded in social, 
economic, and political policy.”45 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
In the present case, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit 
issued a per curiam opinion reversing the district court’s decision to 
remove the Holy See’s sovereign immunity. However, the Ninth 
Circuit did affirm the district court’s decision to allow a respondeat 
superior claim to proceed against the Holy See. 
A. Vicarious Liability 
The Holy See argued that it should not be held liable for the acts 
or omissions of its U.S. corporations because “Doe has not alleged 
facts that would overcome the presumption of separate juridical  
 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. O’Bryan v. Holy See, 471 F. Supp. 2d 784, 790 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (“The FSIA 
provides no definition of ‘official’ or ‘employee.’ Whether . . . clergy are employees of the Holy 
See would appear to be a question of . . . state law.”); Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 
948 (D. Or. 2006) (determining whether someone was an “employee” is governed by state 
law (citing Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319, 325 (9th Cir. 1996))). 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
 42. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (applying the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act). Even 
though the FSIA does not define “discretionary function,” the “language of the discretionary 
function exclusion closely parallels the language of a similar exclusion in the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.” Doe, 557 F.3d at 1083 (per curiam). 
 43. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). 
 44. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322–23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 45. See United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984). 
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status such that the acts of the latter could be attributed to the 
former.”46 The Ninth Circuit agreed.47 In particular, the court 
explained that Doe’s complaint did not allege a “day-to-day, routine 
involvement of the Holy See in the affairs of the [corporations].”48 
The court conceded that Doe’s complaint had alleged that the 
corporations were “agents” of the Holy See, but the court found 
that the mere use of the word “agent” was not sufficient.49 
Additionally, in regard to an equitable prong, the court found that 
Doe’s complaint failed to allege “that the Holy See ha[d] 
inappropriately used the separate status of the corporations . . . for 
the purpose of evading liability for its own wrongs.”50 
B. Tortious Exception 
The Ninth Circuit determined that Doe had appropriately 
pleaded his respondeat superior claim against the Holy See, but that 
the Holy See qualified for the discretionary function exclusion. 
1. Respondeat superior 
The Holy See argued that Doe had failed to plead “sufficient 
facts to demonstrate that Ronan was an ‘employee’ of the Holy  
See . . . because the word ‘employee’ is a legal conclusion.”51 
Although the court recognized that “employee” has a technical 
meaning, it was “highly skeptical of the notion that . . . use of the 
word ‘employee’ in a complaint is insufficient to establish an 
allegation of an employment relationship.”52 The court recognized 
that merely stating that Ronan was an “employee” was sufficient to 
put the Holy See on notice of the allegation because the  
 
 
 46. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1076. 
 47. Id. at 1079. There are two instances where the presumption of separate juridical 
status can be overcome: (1) “where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner 
that a relationship of principal and agent is created,” and (2) where recognizing the separate 
juridical status “would work fraud or injustice.” First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el 
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 48. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1079 (citing Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 
1073 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 49. Id at 1080. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1081. 
 52. Id. 
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commonplace meaning of “employee” was not “so complex or 
contentious . . . [as to] prevent a defendant from understanding the 
factual basis for the claim.”53 
In addition to the inquiry of whether Doe had sufficiently pled 
an employment relationship, the court inquired into whether Doe 
had pled that Ronan had been acting within his “scope of 
employment.”54 Since the FSIA does not define this phrase, the 
court turned to Oregon law, under which an employer could be held 
liable as long as an employee’s authorized activities constituted a 
“necessary precursor” to committing unauthorized actions.55 The 
court found that Doe had sufficiently met this test because he 
alleged that he had come “to know Ronan ‘as his priest, counselor 
and spiritual adviser,’” and that Ronan had used his “‘position of 
authority’ to ‘engage in harmful sexual contact upon’ Doe.”56 
2. Discretionary function exclusion 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Holy See was not directly liable 
for its alleged negligence because its behavior was covered by the 
FSIA’s discretionary function exclusion, an exception to the tortious 
exception.57 Specifically, the court determined that Doe had failed to 
allege that the Holy See had a “specific and mandatory” policy 
prescribing its conduct, and had failed to show that the Holy See’s 
actual judgment was not the kind that the exception was “designed 
to shield.”58 Although Doe did allege that there had been “policies, 
practices, and procedures”59 to avoid firing or warning others of 
abusive priests, the court held that this was insufficient to show that 
the Holy See effectively had no discretion in the matter.60 As to 
whether the discretionary exclusion was “designed to shield”61 the 
Holy See’s judgments, the court determined, on its own, that the  
 
 
 53. Id. at 1081–82. 
 54. Id. at 1082. 
 55. Id. (quoting Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Or. 1999)); see infra notes 
81–83 and accompanying text. 
 56. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1083. 
 57. Id. at 1069, 1083. 
 58. Id. at 1083–84. 
 59. Id. at 1084 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
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Holy See hypothetically might have had a legitimate policy rationale, 
such as a concern over reputation, staffing shortages, or other 
issues.62 
C. Commercial Activity Exception 
Doe cross-appealed from the district court’s decision to deny the 
application of the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. However, 
the Holy See argued that the Ninth Circuit did not have jurisdiction 
over this cross-appeal because it was not “‘inextricably intertwined’ 
with the collaterally appealable issue”––the denial of foreign 
sovereign immunity.63 Although the court recognized that it had the 
prudential and discretionary power to support a district court 
decision on alternative grounds, it refused the opportunity because it 
would have involved “a vast expansion of the issues in and 
complexity of the appeal.”64 
D. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Berzon 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Berzon disagreed with the 
majority’s refusal to consider the application of the commercial 
activity exception. She quoted Ninth Circuit case law describing how 
the court was fully entitled “to preserve the result that the district 
court reached, either by following the district court’s reasoning or by 
a different rationale.”65 She disputed the majority’s prudential 
concerns as nonexistent since the issue “was fully litigated below, the 
district court decided the question, and the issue has been fully 
briefed and argued here.”66 
As to the application, Judge Berzon repeatedly described how 
the “commercial activity” test does not require any profit motive, 
but only that the activity is not “peculiar to sovereigns.”67 She 
argued that the Holy See’s alleged activity is “commercial activity” 
 
 62. Id. at 1085. The court explained that “[t]he Holy See’s failure to present any 
evidence that its actions were actually based on policy considerations is not relevant to whether 
the discretionary function exception applies.” Id. According to the court, the sovereign’s 
actions only need to be “susceptible” to a policy analysis. Id. (quoting Kelly v. United States, 
241 F.3d 755, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
 63. Id. at 1074. 
 64. Id. at 1076 n.5. 
 65. Id. at 1088 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1089–90. 
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because the employment relationship between the Holy See and 
Ronan was not of a “quintessentially sovereign” capacity.68 
Furthermore, she argued, Doe’s negligence claims were “based 
upon” this employment relationship and that even with an arguably 
“tortious essence,” there was no controlling authority that made the 
commercial activity exception inapplicable to Doe’s negligence 
claims.69  
E. Concurring Opinion by Judge Fernandez 
In responding to the dissent, Judge Fernandez wrote a 
concurring opinion to dispute the “oxymoronic proposition that 
church functions are commercial.”70 He described the idea of 
characterizing church functions as commercial as “the veriest 
cynicism about religion” and that “[n]ormal legal usage and 
common sense recoil” from such characterizations.71 Ultimately, he 
concluded that although the Holy See is an abnormal type of foreign 
sovereign, it is not a “merchant” or otherwise engaged in “trade and 
traffic or commerce.”72 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Holy See is important 
because it is the second case this year where the Holy See has been 
thwarted trying to preserve its sovereign immunity.73 The court 
correctly determined that Doe’s respondeat superior claim must 
proceed because the applicable state law essentially mandated that 
result. However, the court’s rationale for denying a review of the 
commercial activity exception is highly suspect since the majority 
apparently had a fundamental misunderstanding of the applicable 
legal standards.  
A. Basis for Respondeat Superior Decision 
The Ninth Circuit correctly determined that Doe’s respondeat 
superior claim had satisfied the requirements of the tortious 
 
 68. Id. at 1089. 
 69. Id. at 1094, 1096. 
 70. Id. at 1097 (Fernandez, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1098. 
 73. The other is O’Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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exception, thereby removing the Holy See’s sovereign immunity for 
that claim. This decision was easily supported by statute, case law, 
and policy considerations. The plain language of the FSIA’s tortious 
exception allowed suit against sovereigns for a “tortious act or 
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that 
foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment.”74 Since the FSIA does not define the key terms, 
“employee” and “scope of employee,” the court then turned to 
Oregon case law.75  
Oregon case law has been on the frontier of expanding the reach 
of the respondeat superior doctrine and even has recent case law that 
specifically addresses respondeat superior claims arising from sexual 
abuse by Roman Catholic clergy.76 As to the first issue, the definition 
of “employee” under Oregon law includes a list of factors, including, 
but not limited to, the “right to . . . control,” and the “right to 
fire.”77 The district court found that Doe had satisfied this test 
because he alleged that the Holy See had the “right to control” 
Ronan, and demonstrated this control by actually “plac[ing] [him] 
in Portland, Oregon.”78 Interestingly enough, while the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court on this issue, it did not even 
acknowledge this test or the district court’s analysis at all.79 Instead, 
the court primarily focused on the issue of whether Doe’s bare 
allegation that Ronan was “employed” by Holy See was sufficient 
under modern notice pleading standards.80 However puzzling, it is 
quite possible that the court didn’t include the actual analysis under 
Oregon law because it thought that, since a bare allegation of  
 
 
 74. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006). 
 75. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 76. Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: 
Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 241 (2007) 
(noting that Oregon is one state that has taken an “expansive approach to scope of 
employment”); see also Michael J. Sartor, Respondeat Superior, Intentional Torts, and Clergy 
Sexual Misconduct: The Implications of Fearing v. Bucher, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 690 
(2005) (“[O]ne jurisdiction [Oregon] has recognized the validity of respondeat superior 
claims asserted against religious organizations in cases involving clergy sexual misconduct.”). 
 77. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 948 (D. Or. 2006) (quoting Stamp v. Dep’t 
of Consumer & Bus. Servs., 9 P.3d 729, 731 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 78. Id. at 949 (citation omitted). 
 79. See Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 80. Id. at 1165. 
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employment was sufficient under notice pleading, including the state 
law analysis would have been superfluous. In either case, the Ninth 
Circuit had adequate support to conclude that Doe had satisfied the 
employment requirement of the tortious exception. 
As to the second issue, the Ninth Circuit cited an Oregon case, 
Fearing v. Bucher, that dealt with substantially the same underlying 
issue of whether the tortious acts of a priest could still be considered 
part of his “scope of employment.”81 In Fearing, the court held that 
an employer could be held liable under respondeat superior for the 
otherwise unauthorized actions of a priest who used his position as a 
priest, pastor, and spiritual mentor as a “necessary precursor” to the 
eventual molestation of a child.82 Doe’s complaint satisfied this test 
because the sexual abuse was necessarily preceded by Ronan’s 
relationship with Doe as “priest, counselor, and spiritual advisor,” 
and a “direct outgrowth” of Ronan’s “position of authority” over 
him.83 Since the facts are so similar between Fearing and the instant 
case, the Ninth Circuit was not only effectively bound to follow the 
“necessary precursor” and “direct outgrowth” analysis from Fearing, 
but also reach the same conclusion. 
Beyond the substantive law cited by the court, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision to allow the respondeat superior claim to proceed 
against the Holy See is also strongly bolstered by the underlying 
policies behind respondeat superior liability. Most prominently, 
employers must realize that they are in the best position to carefully 
screen new employees and supervise existing ones so as to not only 
reduce the liability of the company, but also to reduce and avoid 
causing future injuries to the public.84 Although the Holy See is 
obviously not directly involved in the hiring or supervision of all 
church workers throughout the world, it is still in the best position 
to make and enforce church-wide policy. There is no doubt that as 
the head of a rigidly hierarchical organization it had the unequivocal 
power to set and enforce rigorous hiring and supervision policies 
throughout all levels of the church with a goal of protecting the  
 
 
 81. 977 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Or. 1999). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1083. 
 84. See Sartor, supra note 76, at 723–24. 
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public from the harmful actions of its servants.85 Given that the Holy 
See was, almost certainly, in the best position to make and enforce 
employment policies to protect the public, the Ninth Circuit was 
justified in removing the Holy See’s sovereign immunity in order to 
determine whether it should be held responsible for the harmful 
actions of its alleged employee. 
An additional policy consideration that supports the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision is that employers are usually in a better position to 
“spread losses equitably” and insure that victims are compensated, 
especially when the perpetrator is judgment proof.86 During the past 
decade there has been a firestorm of clergy sexual abuse litigation. 
Even though this litigation has been effective at garnering large 
settlements and verdicts against local branches of the worldwide 
Roman Catholic Church,87 some plaintiffs have encountered 
problems actually collecting damages from these organizations, 
especially when they later declare bankruptcy to protect church assets 
from judgment.88 Furthermore, since many, if not most, members of 
the Roman Catholic clergy take a vow of poverty,89 the actual 
perpetrators of sexual abuse are often judgment-proof, leaving 
victims without adequate compensation for their injuries. In 
contrast, the Holy See has extensive financial resources90 with the 
ability to fairly compensate victims of sexual abuse, such as Doe, for 
the irreparable damage caused by its servants and instrumentalities.91 
Given the tremendous physical, mental, and financial costs borne by 
victims, families, and society at large, the policy of insuring that  
 
 
 85. Cf. Martinez, supra note 3, at 143–44, 150–53 (“[I]n the most important matters, 
the Holy See is capable of using its considerable authority over the worldwide church in an 
attempt to bring about the desirable outcome.”). 
 86. See Sartor, supra note 76, at 724–25. 
 87. See, e.g., Maria L. La Ganga & Duke Helfand, Etching Abuse in Church’s Memory, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at A1 (“The Catholic Church in the U.S. has paid out more than 
$2 billion in legal settlements.”). 
 88. See id. (“Six dioceses have filed for bankruptcy.”); Allison Walsh Smith, Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy: A New Battleground in the Ongoing Conflict Between Catholic Dioceses and Sex-
Abuse Claimants, 84 N.C. L. REV. 282, 315 (2005) (“[A]ny claimant who settled or won a 
claim against a diocese pre-petition [for bankruptcy] was prevented from collecting on that 
settlement or judgment.”). 
 89. See Sartor, supra note 76, at 724. 
 90. See, e.g., Lisa O’Connor, Vatican Loses EUR9.1m, SUNDAY MIRROR, July 13, 2008, 
at 24 (“Experts estimate that the Vatican’s total wealth is in excess of EUR5 billion.”). 
 91. Cf. Martinez, supra note 3, at 143–44. 
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victims are compensated for their injuries certainly justifies the Holy 
See’s loss of sovereign immunity for Doe’s respondeat superior 
claim.  
B. Dodging the Commercial Activity Exception 
The Ninth Circuit unreasonably avoided the issue of whether the 
commercial activity exception applied to the Holy See’s alleged 
behavior. Taken on its face, the three-member panel had the power 
to reject Doe’s cross appeal concerning the district court’s refusal to 
apply the commercial activity exception. However, by analyzing the 
per-curiam opinion and the accompanying concurring opinion, the 
rationale of the two-to-one decision is suspect since the majority 
apparently had a fundamental misunderstanding of the applicable 
legal standards. 
As to the per curiam opinion, the majority refused to address the 
commercial activity exception because it claimed that the issue “seeks 
to expand our inquiry into the arcane question of whether church 
functions are commercial activity because churches receive financial 
support from their parishioners.”92 However, the court’s paraphrase 
of the legal issue is incorrect. Although “commercial activity” might 
refer to trade and exchange in common parlance, in the context of 
the FSIA the phrase is a term of art93 that concerns whether a foreign 
sovereign is exercising “powers peculiar to sovereigns.”94 Whether 
the Holy See receives financial support from parishioners is irrelevant 
to the real question of whether the employment relationship 
between the Holy See and Ronan was of a “quintessentially 
sovereign” capacity, such as “civil service, diplomatic, or military.”95  
This misapprehension can, most likely, be explained by 
examining the concurring opinion of Judge Fernandez, who was part 
of the 2-1 per curiam decision. He said that it was an “oxymoronic 
proposition that church functions are commercial,” and the idea of 
characterizing church functions as commercial is “the veriest 
cynicism about religion.”96 However, his legal support for these 
propositions is highly suspect. He quoted Weltover, which is the 
 
 92. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 93. Id. at 1096 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 94. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 95. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1089 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 1097 (Fernandez, J., concurring). 
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principal Supreme Court case on the issue.97 However, he 
conveniently minimized the Court’s language stating, “the question 
is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit 
motive,”98 and he altogether omitted the Court’s language stating 
that a foreign state engages in commercial activities when it does not 
“exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns.”99  
Instead, Judge Fernandez focused on the Court’s mention of 
“trade and traffic and commerce” as if to suggest that the meaning 
of “commercial activity” were entirely limited to profit-motivated 
activity.100 But the Court in Weltover later mentions that “[e]ngaging 
in a commercial act does not require the receipt of fair value, or even 
compliance with the . . . requirements of consideration.”101 Yet, 
Judge Fernandez appeared immovable, and simply could not get past 
his concern over the apparent contradiction of “religion” and 
“commerce.” Instead of merely disagreeing with the applicable legal 
test, it appears that he crafted his own version to fit a desired result. 
Given this suspect reasoning and analysis, the rationale of the 2-1 
majority also is suspect in its decision to deny a review of the 
commercial activity exception. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Holy See opened the doors 
of justice for one alleged victim of sexual abuse by allowing him to 
bring suit against the Holy See. While the court correctly determined 
that the law must permit Doe’s respondeat superior claim against the 
Holy See, its rationale for denying a review of the commercial 
activity exception is suspect because the majority misunderstood the 
applicable legal standards. 
Aside from providing a landmark victory for victims of alleged 
clergy sexual abuse at St. Albert’s Church in Portland, Oregon, this 
case will have a lasting impact on future clergy sexual abuse litigation 
throughout the country. First, plaintiffs throughout the country will 
have a drafting guide to carefully plead their claims so as to avoid the 
problems the Ninth Circuit found with Doe’s complaint. In 
 
 97. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 98. See Doe, 557 F.3d at 1097 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. 
at 614). 
 99. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614. 
 100. See Doe, 557 F.3d at 1097–98. 
 101. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 616. 
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addition, many more states may consider adopting Oregon’s 
expansive view of respondeat superior liability as a civil means of 
vindicating victims of clergy sexual abuse. 
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